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UDoes the Exchange Rate Regime
Affect the Economy?
T SEEMS TO BE a general rule that countries
wish to peg their exchange rates but sometimes
have floating rates thrust upon them. On three
occasions during the twentieth century—the
breakup of the international gold standald in
the l930s, the breakup of the Bretton Woods
system in the 1970s and most recently the exo-
dus of countries (notably Britain) from the ex-
change rate mechanism (ERM) of the European
Economic Community (EEC)—external pi-essures
led to the demise of fixed rate schemes and
their replacement by some degree of exchange
rate flexibility. In each case, the passing of the
fixed t-ate scheme was mourned and within
relatively short periods a new fixed rate plan
was advanced to replace its fallen predecessor.
In view of these failures, however, it is reason-
able to ask: What makes pegged exchange rates
so attractive?
Recently, in the context of the ERM, two argu-
ments have been advanced. Exchange rate fixity
is, as David flume described in 1752, a way of
importing another country’s monetary policy.i
In the case of the ERM, the deutsche mark
served as the system’s anchor currency, and
1See Flume (1970).
2We do not consider whether a single currency really is a
natural development of fixed exchange rates.
~This argument usually takes as axiomatic that trade crea-
tion will outweigh trade diversion.
Germany’s low inflation i-ate was supposed to
spread throughout the EEC. Moreover, the
ERM’s member nations believed that the Bun-
desbank’s reputation would provide some credi-
bility to the anti-inflation commitment of other
central banks and therefore reduce the costs of
lowering inflation throughout the EEC. A se-
cond motive for adopting fixed exchange rates
has been the claim that they, and ultimately a
single currency, are important to the EEC’s Sin-
gle Market Progt-amme.2 ‘I’he logic is that the
full benefits that could accrue fiom the free
intra-European movement of goods, labor and
capital will be realized only with a fixed ex-
change rate regime.~A third argument, not em-
phasized recently but important on earlier
occasions, is that economic perfot-mance-----
growth, inflation or any other important
measure—is better under a fixed exchange rate
system.4 This third argument differs from the
second in that it identifies no specific causal
chain ft’om exchange rate regime to economic
performance.
But does the exchange rate regime matter for
economic performance? That is the question
4lhis was an important motivation for Britain’s return to the
gold standard in 1925, for example.4
addressed in this paper. We examine empirically
the relationship between the exchange mate re-
gime and a number of key macroeconomic vati-
ables to see whether any systematic relationship
exists between the behavior of these variables
and the exchange rate regime. We have chosen
to investigate this question for the United King-
dom because data over long periods are ayaila-
ble for the variables we ivish to examine and
because the United Kingdom experienced a
wide variety of exchange rate regimes over the
period covered by these data.
TRADE -AND THE EXCHANGE
RATE REGIME
The claim that exchange rate flexibility ham-
pers international trade in goods and in capital
and thus depresses welfare amid perhaps growth
is based on the existence of uncertainty.
It is argued that removing the possibility of
exchange rate change will remove an important
nontarifF barrier, because the possibility of ex-
change rate changes will deter some traders
and investors altogether, whereas others will
have to pay a substantial cost to fix the domes-
tic value of their foreign currency receipts.
Floating exchange rates, in other words, are be-
lieved to impose additional volatility, and hence
costs, on international markets. If this is cor-
rect, a case for pegged exchange rates exists,
and the case is particularly strong fot any
group of countries (such as the EEC) that wants
to encourage mutual international trade and in-
vestment.
‘The proposition seems unexceptional, and for
a number of years studies supported the propo-
sition. For example, Cushman (1983) and de-
Grauwe and deBellefroid (1937), which are
representative of the early literature, found that
floating rates did impede trade. But as time
passed, an increasing number’ of studies sup-
ported it.i
By the early I 990s, not only had evidence
shifted to support the notion that floating ex-
change rates do not impede trade, but Feldstein
(1992) even went so far as to suggest that float-
ing rates are more favorable to trade than are
fixed rates.t Attention is thus directed to other
reasons for favoring pegged exchange tates.
‘rhere are two rather distinct types of effects
of exchange rate fixing. ‘I’he first arises because
if a fixed exchange rate is in place, it is unlikely
to stay fixed without policy actions. These can
take several form& Most common are foreign
exchange intervention and short-term interest
rate manipulation. Accurate figures on official
intervention or the stock of foreign exchange
reserves are not always availabla Interest rate
figures, however, are ayailable, and several
authors have found that unpredictable interest
rate variability increased after exchange rates
are pegged.~These actions in turn make money
growth more volatile, and this can have impor-
tant consequences for the economy. It may cre-
ate additional uncertainty about the future
hehayior of the price level and thus about real
tates of return, which would affect investment.
If future prices were uncertain, wage bargain-
ing would he more complex because it would
be harder to judge the future purchasing power
of an agreed money wage. This uncertainty
would also affect nominal variables. Risk-averse
investors would be more reluctant to buy
government bonds because they would he un-
certain what the coupons would be worth and
what the capital would be worth at maturity.
This would raise nominal interest rates, the cost
of debt service and thus the taxes necessary to
service the debt. All these factors could have an
advem’se effect on long-term growth, depressing
its trend.
In summary, the choice of exchange rate re-
gime could affect the long-run behavior of the
economy, influencing trends or cycles in impor-
tant macroeconomic variables.
If the choice of exchange rate regime does not
have these long-run consequences, then in
terms of macroeconomic effects, all that the
choice of exchange rate regime does is shift the
distribution of short-run fluctuations from one
market to another. This is the second type of
effect noted above.
‘The question we examine is whether any as-
tExamples of these studies are Gotur (1985); the IMF’s
(1984) extension of Cushman (1983) to cover the bilateral
trade of the seven largest industrial countries; Bryant
(1987), Bailey, Tavlas and Ulan (1986 and 1987), Bailey and
Tavlas (1988) and Ascheim, Bailey and Tavlas (1987).
tHaberler (1986) suggested the same thing some years
earlier.
7See Batchelor and Wood (1982), Wood (1983) and Belongia
(1988). Wood and Belongia’s research was conducted in
the context of the ERM. In Wood (1983) there was an ex-
ception to this—Erie (South Ireland) after it joined the
ERM. Unpredictable interest rate variability fell in that
country, although it increased in every other ERM member
country.sociation exists between the exchange rate re-
gime and the trend or cyclical behavior of some
key macroeconomic variables—in other words,
whether there is any evidence for the first type
of effect. If no such association exists, then the
only macroeconomic consequence of the choice
of exchange rate regime is the change in the
distribution of short-term volatility between the
foreign exchange market and the short-term
money markets. If, in contrast, such an associa-
tion exists, then the choice of exchange rate re-
gime may be a macroeconomic policy decision
of considerable impot-tance for national well-
heing.8
It is now appropriate to present the data we
use for exploring this question. We then exa-
mine the properties of those data in light of the
preceding discussion.
THE STOCHASTIC PROPERTIES
OF U.K. MACROECONOMIC SERIES
ACROSS EXCHANGE RATE
REGIMES
In this section we consider the stochastic
properties of five major U.K. macroeconomic
series since the mid-nineteenth century. The ex-
change rate regimes since then have encom-
passed every possible type except the crawling
peg. Until 1914, the United Kingdom was on the
gold standard. That was suspended (that is, the
United Kingdom left the standard but with the
declared intention of returning) at the outbreak
of World War I in 1914. After the war, the
United Kingdom implemented a deliberate, dis-
cussed and announced policy of a return to the
gold standard at the prewar parity. Monetat-y
policy and foreign exchange intervention were
used to this end, and the policy succeeded in
1925. The United Kingdom left the gold stan-
dard in 1931, however, and the exchange rate
floated with varying degrees of intervention un-
til the outbreak of World Wat 11 in 1939.~The
rate was then pegged to the U.S. dollat. After
5
the wat-, the United Kingdom joined the Bretton
Woods system. Several sterling devaluations oc-
curred under Bretton Woods, but sterling did
not finally float until 1972. Again, there were
vatying degrees of intervention under this re-
gime of dirty floating, hut the United Kingdom
did not formally peg sterling until it joined the
ERM in 1990 after shadowing the deutsche
mark in 1988 and 1989. The United Kingdom
subsequently left the ERM in 1992 to float once
more. The series we examine across these vari-
ous regimes are output, prices, money, and
short- and long-term interest rates.
Our particular interest, and the focus of the
empirical work that follows, is the trend and
the cycle in output and prices primarily, hut
also in money and interest rates. We look to see
how these var-iahles have behaved over- our
close to a century-and-a-quarter- of data, seeking
changes in trend and changes in cyclical pat-
tern. When these are identified, we examine
whether any of these changes are associated
with exchange rate regime changes and, if so,
considei why this might he.
Output
Annual output in the United Kingdom (incas-
ured in logarithms) over’ the period 1855-1990
is shown in figure 1. Detailed econometric ana-
lyses of this series in Mills (1991) and Mills and
Wood (1993) show that it can he represented as
the sum of a segmented linear trend, with
breaks at 1918 and 1921 and a stationary, au-
toregressive, cyclical component.1°Thus these
results indicate that if output can he decom-
posed as = +ri, then the trend function t~, is
(1) ~, = a+Bt + A,D,, + A7])2,,
where D~=(t—T)if t>T,. and zero otherwise.
The identified breakpoints are at = 64 and
T2=67, which coincide with 1918 and 1921. The
cyclical component, n,, on the other hand, is
found to be adequately modeled as an AR(2)
°Itis, of course, possible that the exchange rate regime is a
product of the behavior of the economy; it need not be an
exogenous choice.
tFor a review and evaluation of explanations that have been
advanced to explain the United Kingdom’s abandonment of
the gold standard, see Capie, Mills and Wood (1986a).
‘tTesting for stationarity has no direct economic significance.
Rather, it lets us separate the cycle from the trend. The
notion is that the trend and the cycle are economically
separate. The cycle comprises fluctuations about a horizon-
tal average; growth is all in the trend- This separation is
consistent with most views of the cycle, but it should be
noted that some scholars see the cycle as an integral part
of the growth process- For an example, see Schumpeter
(1950).6
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‘rhis model has some simple properties. Trend
growth is 1.96 percent per year until 1919 and
2.29 percent per year from 1922 on, with the
level of trend output falling 28.3 percent in the
intervening three years. The component n, im-
plies that output exhibits stationary cyclical fluc-
tuations around the trend growth path, with
cycles averaging 8.1 year-s. The residual stan-
dard error of the equation is 2.33 percent.
The trend component is shown superimposed
on the output series in figure 1, and we thus
conclude that, apart from the three years im-
mediately after World War I, during which the
series fell dramatically, the stochastic process
generating output has remained remarkably sta-
ble. Output is a trend stationary process, ir-
respective of the exchange rate regime in force.
Prices
Figures 2 and 3 present plots of the (logarith-
mic) U.K. price level annually from 1870 to
1990 and monthly froni January 1922 to May
1992, respectively, excluding the war years
from 1940 to 1945. Unit root tests, calculated
over various sample periods, provide little or no
evidence against the hypothesis that prices are
difference stationary, that is, 1(1).’’ The
post-1973 era may differ and is discussed later.
Tivo aspects of price behavior are worth fur-
1860 70 80 90 1900 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 1990
“Details of these tests and similar tests for the other series
investigated are reported in Mills and Wood (1993).7
Figure 2
Annual U.K. Price Level (1 870-1939)
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Figure 3
U.K. Price Level (1922-1 939)
Logarithms
3
1922 23 24 25 26
U.K. Price Level (1946-1 992)










194648 5052545658 6062 646668 7072 747678 8082 848688 9019929
ther investigation. The first is the behavior of
the price level before the United Kingdom aban-
doned the gold standard in 1931. Mills (1990)
analyzes the long gold standard period from
1729 to 1931 and obtains an estimate of the lar-
gest autoregressive root of 0.93, identical to that
obtained for the shorter sample beginning in
1870. The corresponding unit root test, though,
rejects the unit root null hypothesis at the 5
percent significance level, and the process
found to generate the price level (an autoregres-
sion of order two) yields cycles of around 50
years, close to the long swings thought to have
characterized prices during this period.”
The second aspect concerns the post-1946 be-
havior of prices. Figures 2 and 3 show the ser-
ies to have undergone slope changes around
1973 and 1983; possible explanations for these
are discussed in the next paragraph and in the
Interpretation and Conclusions section. Statisti-
cally, this behavior is typical of an 1(2) process,
and repeating the unit root tests for the (log-
arithmic) price changes, that is, for inflation,
yields some evidence that postwar prices can be
modeled as an 1(2) process (evidence that infla-
tion is nonstationary), particularly for the post-
Bretton Woods era beginning in 1973.
The results are therefore suggestive of the
U.K. price level undergoing two shifts in its
generating process. The first might be associat-
ed with the abandonment of the gold standard,
shifting the series from 1(0) to an 1(1) process.
(From figure 3 it is in fact clear that prices did
not start a secular increase until mid-1933, some
two years after the move from the gold stan-
dard.)” A stable price level is certainly in accor-
dance with what would be expected under the
gold standard (or, in principle, any commodity
standard). There were fluctuations in the supply
of gold, but in countries such as the United
Kingdom, which had developed and stable bank-
ing systems, these fluctuations had only modest
price level effects. The system was to some ex-
tent self-stabilizing. If prices were falling (the
value of money rising) because the supply of
gold was falling short of demand, them-c was an
incentive to produce more gold. And if prices
were rising (the value of money falling), then as
the costs of gold production rose relative to
what the monetary authorities would pay for
gold, the incentive to produce gold would
diminish.” The second shift is around 1973 and
could be associated with both the move to float-
ing exchange rates and the first oil price shock.
Money
Figure 4 plots annual observations of the
logarithms of M3 from 1871 to 1912 (the only
aggregate apart from the monetary base availa-
ble for this period), and figure 5 plots monthly
observations of M3 from 1922 to 1989, exclud-
ing the war years. From a battery of unit root
tests, we found that, for all sample periods in-
vestigated, the null hypothesis of a unit root
cannot be rejected. Moreover, the series is in-
deed 1(1) because we could not establish that
further differencing was required for sta-
tionarity.
Interest Rates
Figures 6 through 8 plot monthly observations
of short-and long-term interest rates from 1870
to 1992, excluding war years and related peri-
ods of interest rate restrictions.
From the results of unit root tests, we find
that since the lifting of restrictions after World
War II both short- and long-term interest rates
have been 1(1) processes, but their behavior be-
fore 1939 is rather different. Both are station-
ary between 1932 and 1939, but during the
1920s long-term rates are stationary (1(0)) and
short-term rates are 1(1), whereas before 1914
the orders of integration are reversed.”
Trend and Cycle Decompositions
Has the variability about trend of the series
altered across regimes? This is an important
question because of the widespread belief that
floating exchange rates increase volatility in
prices, interest rates, and economic activity and
are in some general sense destablizing. To an-
swer this question, we need to decompose each
series into trend and cycle components. There
are many ways to do this, ranging from using a
predetermined moving average to calculate
trend to designing a signal extraction filter
based on the stochastic process generating the
data and a set of assumptions relating to the be-
havior of the unobserved components.
l
t
See Cagan (1984) for an extended discussion of this view,
l
t
See the discussion in Capie, Mills and Wood (1986a).
‘4See Barro (1979) and Rockoff (1984) for a discussion of this.
‘tCapie, Mills and Wood (1986b) provides an extended dis-
cussion of the behavior of these two interest rate series in
relation to the Stock Conversion of 1932.10
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For output, equation (1) provides the appropri-
ate decomposition. Table 1 thus reports the
standamd deviations of the cyclical component n,
for a variety of sample periods. the sample
periods shown were chosen by two quite dis-
tinct criteria—output trend change and ex-
change rate regime alteration. The 1922 break
was used because after the 1919—22 discontinui-
ty, output resumed a new trend, 1855—1913
were gold standard years, and 1925—31 were
years during which the United Kingdom was
either on or committed to returning to the gold
standard. The period comprising 1855—1913 and
1922—31 is the same period omitting war and
the postwar years of the break in output’s
trend. The period 1922—31 has a stable output
trend combined with commitment to gold; the
period 1922—39 has a stable output trend with a
change in exchange rate regime. ‘the period
1932—90 is our whole sample period after gold.
The years 1932—39 and 1946—90 are, of course,
the same period excluding the World War Ii
years. The period 1946—90 is~~sh~plypostwar;
1946—72 is Bretton Woods; and 1973—90 is the
period of vam-ious degrees of float. (Further sub-
division of the series to examine the association
with various exchange rate regimes more
minutely, although appealing, is ruled out by
many of these regimes having too few output
observations for our statistical techniques.)
From all these statistics, one gets the impression
that variability about trend has increased during
the twentieth century. In particular, the aban-
donment of the gold standard in 1931 seems to
have been accompanied by an increased varia-
bility of output about trend, even after the war
years are excluded. In summary, the standard
deviation almost doubled (from 2.87 percent to
5.49 percent) after 1931. But it should be noted
that variability fell after the pound floated in
1972. From 1946 to 1972 the standard deviation
was 4.45 percent; from 1973 to 1990 it was 3.64
percent.
For the other series, we have presented evi-
dence of shifts in the stochastic processes
generating them, so signal extraction techniques
would be rather difficult to apply. We have
chosen therefore to use a technique that has
proved popular in recent years for re-examining
the stylized facts of macroeconomic time series,
namely the detrending filter proposed for use in
economics by Flodrick and Prescott and used,
II I~~1 II
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U.K. Interest Rates (1870-1913)
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Figure 7
U.K. Interest Rates (1922-1939)
Percent
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Figure 8







for example, in Kvdland and Prescott.’°’I’hisis
an alternative to the method used earlier in the
paper for separating a series into trend and cy-
cle. It is described in the appendix, which also
contains a summary of when this method is ap-
propriate and when it may be misleading.
Tables 2 through S report statistics assessing
the variability of the trend and cycle compo-
nents of the price level, money supply and
short- and long-interest rates, and figures 9
through 12 present graphs for these compo-
nents. Although these tables report results from
the examination of monthly data, the break-
points are at year ends except for 1992, whose
data end with June.
‘this choice of breakpoints reflects two con-
siderations. The first relates to when an ex-
change rate regime changed. Does change for
our purposes relate to when the change was
formally announced or to when it became ex-
pected and affected behavior? The latter is the
more significant, but it is not clear a pr-ion
when it would he. Nor as it turns out does
detailed examination of the data case by case
give clear-cut answers.’’ Accordingly, the simple
expedient of using calendar years as break-
points was adopted, on the gm-ounds that using
other dales close to these would not change the
results.
For the interwar years, the trend of the price
level was relatively flat, with a slow decline un-
til 1933 and an upward drift thereafter. The cv-
clical component, in contrast, is relatively
volatile, no doubt, in view of the unchanged be-
havior of money, reflecting the changes in ex-
change rate policy in the United Kingdom, as
well as the disturbed external environment. Not
only did the interwar years include the Gm’eat
Depression in the United States, with the as-
sociated severely depressing effects on the
pmices of commodities, hut in continental Eu-
rope there wet-c inflations—hvperinflations in
some cases—civil war and revolutions. Mean-
while Britain’s exchange rate regime was chang-
ing rapidly. Between 1919 and 1925 there was a
1954 58 62 66 70 74 78 82 86 1990
“See Hodrick and Prescoft (1980) and Kydland and Prescott
(1990).
“See Mills and Wood (1993). For a subset covering the
years 1870—1939, see Capie and Wood (forthcoming).Table 1 TabLe 3
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Table ~ Component Variability ofShod-Term Interest Rates
Component Variab~hWØ Rn.eq.. ~ s,
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$ sample start am deviation Of cycle component S~ sample standard deviation o cyc e ‘compon n
commitment to return to gold at the prewar 3 percent although the fam greater stability of
parity, and the exchange rate iosc steadily long-term rates is reflected in the almost cons-
toi~ ard that. Gold rs as abandoned in 1931 md tant components of this series u lathe to shott-
the exchange rate thereafter floated t%ith van- term rates.18 ~ olatilit is indeed fairly stable un-
ous degrees of in en ention until the outbreak til 1972 after u hich both trend and cycle com-
of u ar in 1939. ponents became constdcrahly more vat iahle
Xfter 1946 the trend is smooth and monoton-
ic, and the c clical component is less ~olatile 1
than before. trend monex is rather similar to
trend prices. Its ~amiahilit~ i- stable throughout
the sample period, supporting the suggestion .. Vt hen discussing the preceding findings, mt is
that external factors v~ en’ important in interwam-
cons enient to consmder the trend and cyclical
price tolatihtv.
behavior of each series together. We start ~ ith
Pre 1914 trend intei cst rates fluctuate around output. As noted pre~ iously, the trend grouth
“We have noted this result In a series of previous papers and Wood (1992) was unable to reject this hypothesis after
Mills and Wood (1982) suggested it was due to the stable exhaustive testing.
price expectations provided by the gold standard. Mills15
of output changed from 1.96 percent per year
to 2.29 percent per year between 1919 and
1922. speculating on what produced that wel-
come change is outside the scope of this paper’.
What we would note is the stability of the
post-1922 trend in the face of a wide variety of
monetary experiences and exchange rate re-
gimes, a finding clearly consistent with the long-
run neutrality of money.
In contrast to that long-run neutrality, the cy-
clical behavior was affected. The variability of
output rose substantially with the abandonment
of the gold standard. The significance of this is
discussed later.
Turning now to prices, what do we find? The
first notable feature is the essentially flat trend,
with long swings around it, under the gold stan-
dard. More dramatic and equally revealing
about the nature of the monetary regime is the
post-1946 period. The trend of pm-ices was posi-
tive after 1946, accelerated sharply around 1973
and slowed around 1983. The United Kingdom
went to a floating exchange rate in 1972, but at
around the same time there was also the first
oil price shock and the Heath-Barber monetary
expansion. That the acceleration of prices was
the result of these factors rather- than the new
exchange rate system is suggested by the slow-
ing of prices around 1983, when the United
Kingdom was still under a floating rate regime
but had a government strongly committed to
reducing inflation by introducing money supply
targets and a commitment to budget balance
over the cycle.” The cyclical component of
prices became much smoother and was un-
affected by the exchange rate regime; its varia-
bility was unchanged from 1946 to 1992 and
identical over subperiods and the period as a
whole.
And finally, interest rates. The striking con-
trast is between the behavior in the pre-World
War tI period, when long-term rates were sta-
ble and short-term rates were volatile, an obser-
vation usually interpreted as reflecting
expectations of long-run price level stability arid
behavior in the post-1972 period, when inflation
first accelerated and then slowed, and both in-
terest rate series displayed markedly increased
variability.”
How do these findings as a whole bear on the
hypothesis that the exchange rate regime is not
a source of volatility? They support it. Of the
variety of exchange rate regimes after 1913 (we
turn to the gold standard in a moment), none
seemed to increase the volatility of any series
examined to any significant extent. The policy
changes necessary to hold rates pegged may
have appeared in foreign exchange reserves, a
series that we did not examine because reliable
data were not available. The policy changes did
appear in movements that had higher’ frequen-
cies than the trends and cycles we isolate.hm In-
terest rate cyclical variability did increase with
the move to floating exchange rates in 1972, but
there arc numerous other factors to explain
this. shocks to the price of oil disturbed finan-
cial markets very substantially in this period.
Two other shocks were superimposed on the oil
price shocks. There was a commitment to
reduce nflation—particulanly after 1979. What
this me~’. ~t in terms of the operation of mone-
tary policy was unknown, so the commitment
increased uncertainty for a time. And further,
monetary targets were adopted. These affected
how the authorities used short-term interest
rates; and as commitment to monetary targets
“The role of the exchange rate regime in the 1970s episode
is also discussed in Williamson and Wood (1976). The con-
clusion that the exchange rate regime was not at fault was
also, by different means, argued there.
“See Mills and Wood (1982). Fisher (1930), Friedman and
Schwartz (1982), and Mills and Wocd (1992). All have ex-
planations of the Gibson paradox that depend on slow-
moving price expectations.
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became increasingly credible, the relationship
between movements in short- and long-term
rates changed.”
It cannot but be observed that there was
greater stability of output, interest rates and
prices under the gold standard than under any
subsequent exchange rate regime. But, of
course, the gold standard was more than an ex-
change rate regime. It was a system, a set of
rules, for the conduct of monetary policy. As
Bordo (1993) wrote, “The gold standard rule can
be viewed as a form of contingent rule or a
rule with escape clauses. The monetary authori-
ty maintains the standard—that is, keeps the
price of the currency in terms of gold fixed—
except in the event of a well-understood emer-
gency, such as a major war or a financial crisis.
In wartime it may suspend gold convertibility
and issue paper money to finance its expendi-
tures, and it can sell debt issues in terms of the
nominal value of its currency on the under-
standing that debt will eventually be paid off in
gold. The rule is contingent in the sense that
the public understands that the suspension will
last only for the duration of the wartime etner-
gency plus some period of adjustment. It as-
sumes that afterward the government will
follow the deflationary policies necessary to re-
sume payments at the original parity.” lt may be
consistent with this interpretation of the gold
standard that with the floating exchange rate of
the 1970s, output variability fell, but not to
where it had been under the gold standard. The
argument would be that monetary policy was
now clearly focused on internal objectives and
not subject to the vicissitudes of a multitude of
shocks from the outside world.
All in all, then, it appears clear that the ex-
change rate regime in the United Kingdom has
not been a source of volatility for the main
macroeconomic variables. For that reason we
need not consider why exchange rate regimes
might affect real economic performance—in the
United Kingdom they did not. The case for
a fixed i—ate regime in the United Kingdom ap-
parently must depend only on its traditional
source of support—the desire to import price
level performance.
It is, of course, important to consider whether
these results generalize to other economies.
There is virtually no feature of the U.K. econo-
my to indicate that they should not.23 The com-
position of output is not unusual; the U.K.
economy has always been fairly open. It was a
dominant economy internationally for only a
modest part of our period, and it has not gone
through hyperinflation or recessions as severe
as those in some other economies, so such
problems cannot have biased our results.
Though we would not claim that our findings
are more than those of a case study, we would
suggest that they are findings we would not be
surprised to see roughly repeated in studies of
other countries.
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Appendix
The Hodrick-Preseott Filter
The filter proposed by Hodrick and Prescott (2)y, = A[p~2—4M+,+(6+A-’)y ‘-4~,+p.J
(1980) has a long tradition as a method of fitting
a smooth curve through a set of points, ver- Using the lag operator B, defined such that
sions of it being used as an actuai’ial graduation B’p=p1, this can he written as
formula. Given the traditional decomposition
y,=p,+n,, the trend series p, is obtained as the (3) Y, =
solution to the problem of minimizing = AE(1 — BY(I — B’)2
+ A -
‘V I’
(1) E Ey .~]2 + A [(~.i~y) ~ so that if an infinite series of y values were available, M, would be given by the two-sided
moving average
with respect to ji,, M7’ ~. The first order con- = aV , a = a
-= I ‘-I I -i dition for this minimization problem is /-20
where the weights can be calculated from
(5~ a(B) = [Mi -BY(I -B~)2+nt
King and Rebelo (1989) provide expressions for
the a1, which do not take a simple form. For-
tunately, Hodrick and Prescott (1980) provide an
algorithm that removes the need to calculate
the moving average weights and so allows the
trend to he computed when only a finite num-
ber of y observations are available. This al-
gorithm was employed to compute the
decompositions used here, noting that the cycli-
cal component can be obtained by residual as
‘~=v — p. Typically, following Hodrick and Pres-
cott, A is set at 100 if annual data are used or
1,600 if quarterly or monthly data are used.’
Harvey and Jaeger (1991), for example, show
that the filter a(BLv, can be interpreted as being
the optimal estimate of p when y, is generated
by the structural model





rçNID (0,02), ~~NID ~~,°V’ A =
An observed series may not be generated even
approximately by such a model, and even if it
is, the ratio of the two innovation vat’iances
may be very different from the assumed value
of A. Harvey and Jaeger argue that the Hodrick-
Prescott filter may create spurious cycles, dis-
tort the estimates of the components or both.
King and Rebelo argue in similar vein, although
they focus on the calculation of sample moments
of the estimated trend and cycle components.
Given these strictures, we emphasize that our
use of the filter is purely for explor’atory pur-
poses outside the confines of any explicit model.
‘See Hodrick and Prescott (1980).